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Alberta Radio cover: WAR AS INDUSTRY. A dusk city street with cracked pavement and red maple leaves, and a phone on a windowsill sending abstract cyan data streams. Headline WAR AS INDUSTRY, subline Urban battlefields, emergency powers, and the digital front. Alberta Radio branding.

War Is an Industry. Our Cities Are Becoming the Test Bed.

2 days ago
11 min read
Alberta Radio cover: WAR AS INDUSTRY. A dusk city street with cracked pavement and red maple leaves, and a phone on a windowsill sending abstract cyan data streams. Headline WAR AS INDUSTRY, subline Urban battlefields, emergency powers, and the digital front. Alberta Radio branding.

For decades I have watched military spending, private armies, and digital weapons grow while governments practise urban combat overseas and reach for emergency powers at home. The facts are on the record. What I think they point to is my theory — and I will label it that way.

By Jason LaFace | Alberta Radio

Thursday, November 19, 2026

I have been an activist in this country for fifteen years. I was in the Freedom Convoy. Long before that, in the era when Kevin Mitnick was the name everyone in my world knew, I ran with hacking groups — H4G1S, Wrecking Krew, Panz, 3th0. I have been watching the security state, the war business, and the cyber domain for about thirty-five years. I still keep those skills current. I will not turn this article into a technical manual. That is not the point, and it is not who I was taught to be.

What I want to put on the table is simpler, and harder. War is not only a tragedy. It is an industry. The Middle East has been used, over and over, as a laboratory for fighting in cities. At home, rapid immigration, social strain, and heavier policing have arrived alongside emergency powers I saw used in 2022. Online, states now treat power grids and other public systems as targets. I will walk through what can be sourced. Then I will say, clearly, what I think it means. That last part is my opinion. It is not a proven plot.

War as an industry

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which has tracked this longer than most governments would like, recorded world military expenditure of $2,718 billion in 2024 — a 9.4 per cent real-terms increase, the steepest year-on-year rise since at least 1988, and the tenth straight year of growth. In 2025, SIPRI says spending rose again, for an eleventh consecutive year, to $2,887 billion, or about 2.5 per cent of the world's gross domestic product.

The United States remained the largest spender: $997 billion in 2024, then $954 billion in 2025. SIPRI attributes much of that one-year drop to a cut in overseas military aid, not to some sudden conversion to peace. The 32 NATO members spent $1,506 billion in 2024 and $1,581 billion in 2025 — about 55 per cent of the world total in both years. China, Russia, Germany, and India rounded out the top five in 2025, together with the United States.

That is the official, state-budget side of the business. The irregular side has been just as real. For decades, wars have been fought not only by national armies but by rebel groups, terrorist organizations, and private military companies. Blackwater, the U.S. contractor founded by Erik Prince, became a symbol of the Iraq War's outsourced battlefield. In September 2007, Blackwater guards opened fire in Baghdad's Nisour Square. U.S. prosecutors later charged the shooters in the killing of Iraqi civilians; four former employees were convicted in 2014. The company was later rebranded, first as Xe Services and then as Academi, and is now part of Constellis. In December 2020, then-President Donald Trump pardoned the four men.

Russia's Wagner Group, a private military company long associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin, fought in Ukraine, supported the Assad government in Syria, and operated across parts of Africa. A U.S. Congressional Research Service primer traces that arc from Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 through Syria, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan. In June 2023, Wagner staged an armed mutiny against Russia's military leadership. Prigozhin died two months later. Wagner's structures were later reorganized under tighter state control, including an "Africa Corps."

I am not saying every rebel or every contractor is the same. I am saying the modern war economy is a market. States, alliances, militias, and companies all draw pay, weapons, and political usefulness from conflict that does not end.

The Middle East as a test bed for urban warfare

If you want to know how a future fight in a city might look, you do not have to invent it. Militaries have been studying it in the Middle East for twenty years, and they have written the lessons down.

The Second Battle of Fallujah, in November and December 2004, was one of the hardest urban fights U.S. and Iraqi forces faced in Iraq: close streets, prepared defences, and a civilian population still in the picture. The Stimson Center has noted how Fallujah exposed the limits of open-field competence once the fight moved into a dense city.

Then came Mosul and Raqqa, in the war against the Islamic State. The Battle of Mosul ran from October 2016 to July 2017. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, looking back on that campaign and on Raqqa, reported that the United Nations certified more than 13,000 structures demolished or made uninhabitable in West Mosul in about 180 days of battle, and about 11,000 structures — some 80 per cent of the city's buildings — in Raqqa in 90 days. The United States, the Institute noted, supported 277 days of urban fighting in Mosul and 90 days in Raqqa.

Syria's cities were not a side story. Aleppo, Raqqa, and other urban battlegrounds became case studies in siege, firepower, and the mixing of regular forces, militias, and foreign backers.

Gaza is now part of the same file. After Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel and the war that followed, Western military institutions began publishing tactical lessons from the urban fighting: tunnels and fortified buildings, surface and subsurface operations at the same time, drones, the difficulty of distinguishing fighters from civilians, and what the Royal United Services Institute has called "devastated terrain warfare." I am not going to relitigate the entire war in this space. I am pointing to something narrower, and documented: armies and think tanks are already treating these cities as a school.

The pattern is not subtle. A doctrine written in blood in Fallujah, Mosul, Raqqa, and Gaza does not stay in the desert. It comes home in training, in equipment, and in the way police and governments think about "the urban problem."

Immigration, unrest, and emergency powers at home

I will be direct about Canada, because I live here, and because I was in Ottawa in 2022.

Statistics Canada estimated that on January 1, 2025, Canada's population was 41,528,680. Of those, 3,020,936 were non-permanent residents — 7.3 per cent of the country. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada reported that Canada admitted 483,640 permanent residents in 2024, after 471,808 in 2023. Those are official figures, not rumours. Housing, hospitals, and social trust have been under obvious strain. Other Commonwealth countries have faced their own versions of high inflows, housing pressure, and a political backlash. I am talking about the scale and speed of policy, and about what governments do when the social fabric tightens. I am not asking anyone to hate their neighbour.

Unrest follows when people feel they are being told to absorb more than the system can carry. The state's answer, more and more often, is a harder edge: tactical units, financial pressure, surveillance, and laws written for emergencies.

I do not have to theorize about that last part. On February 14, 2022, for the first time since the Emergencies Act became law in 1988, the federal government declared a public order emergency over the Freedom Convoy protests and related border blockades. The declaration was revoked on February 23. In those nine days, emergency orders allowed police to prohibit assemblies, designate "protected" places, compel tow-truck operators, and freeze bank accounts without the ordinary process Canadians expect.

The Public Order Emergency Commission, led by Justice Paul Rouleau, reported in February 2023 that, in his view, the high legal threshold for invocation had been met — "with reluctance." He also catalogued failures by police and governments that, he wrote, helped the situation spiral, and he made 56 recommendations.

The courts have now said something different. On January 23, 2024, Federal Court Justice Richard Mosley declared the decision to issue the proclamation, and the associated regulations and economic order, unreasonable and ultra vires — beyond the authority of the Act. He found that the regulations infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, that the economic order infringed the protection against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8, and that neither infringement was justified under section 1. On January 16, 2026, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the government's appeals (2026 FCA 6). The appellate court agreed that the government had not shown reasonable grounds to believe a national emergency or a "threat to the security of Canada," as the Act defines those terms, existed, or that existing laws could not handle the situation.

I was there. I watched a peaceful political protest, and the disorder around its edges, used to justify extraordinary federal power — including the freezing of people's money. A public inquiry gave the government a measure of cover. Two levels of court have now said the invocation was unlawful. Canadians should not forget that sequence. Emergency powers, once used, are easier to use again.

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Digital warfare, and an older ethic

The other battlefield is already inside the systems that keep a city alive.

The United States has identified the Russia-linked group Sandworm as Unit 74455 of Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU. Sandworm has been tied to disruptions of Ukraine's power grid in 2015 and in 2016, the latter using malware known as Industroyer. In 2022, during Russia's full-scale invasion, investigators reported further attempts and, in some cases, successful disruptive attacks on Ukrainian energy systems, including Industroyer2 and a later operational-technology intrusion documented by Mandiant in which Sandworm access was used to help trip substation equipment and cause an unplanned outage.

China is in the same arena. In 2024, CISA, the NSA, and the FBI assessed that a People's Republic of China state-sponsored group known as Volt Typhoon had compromised information-technology networks at multiple U.S. critical-infrastructure organizations — including communications, energy, transportation, and water — and was "pre-positioning" for disruptive or destructive attacks in a future crisis or conflict. The agencies were clear: this was not described as ordinary espionage. Canada's communications security establishment, in the same advisory, assessed that the direct threat to Canadian infrastructure was likely lower than the threat to the United States, but that Canada would likely be affected if U.S. systems were disrupted, because the two countries' infrastructure is so tightly linked. No public report I am citing here claims Volt Typhoon has already blacked out American or Canadian cities. Pre-positioning is not the same as a blackout. It is still a warning about intent.

Western states are not spectators. Stuxnet, discovered in 2010, damaged centrifuges at Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant by attacking industrial control systems. It was a demonstration that code can break machines, not just steal files. The U.S. and Israeli governments have not formally claimed it, but major reporting — including the New York Times and the Washington Post in 2012, citing current and former U.S. officials — has described Stuxnet as part of a joint U.S.–Israeli operation sometimes called Olympic Games. Edward Snowden later said the NSA and Israel "co-wrote" it. I am staying with what has been reported, not with what I cannot prove.

The Snowden disclosures of 2013 also showed the public how far the NSA and its Five Eyes partners had already gone into bulk collection and into offensive toolkits. I will not recite methods here. The point is the posture. Offensive cyber programs are now a normal instrument of state power, including among democracies that lecture others about the rules.

That is the opposite of the ethic I was raised in. The old-school hacker ethic I learned was about curiosity, access, and understanding systems — getting into anything, if you could, to see how it worked. It was not about dropping a hospital, a water plant, or a power grid. You do not prove your intelligence by harming the public. I have kept my skills current at a high level because I want to understand the world I am describing. I will not publish a how-to, and I will not pretend that "hacker" and "soldier in a server room" are the same job.

When states treat the civilian grid as a legitimate target, or as a hostage for the next crisis, they have crossed a line I refused to cross as a young man. I still refuse it.

My theory: what I think the end game is

This section is my opinion and my analysis. It is not a court finding, and it is not a declassified file. I want that said up front, with respect for readers who will disagree.

My theory is this. Governments, armed with a military-industrial machine that needs conflict the way a furnace needs fuel, are preparing for localized urban warfare amid social unrest. The overseas city fights I have described are not only foreign wars. They are practice. The emergency powers used in Canada in 2022, the hardening of domestic policing, the strain that comes with rapid demographic change, and the quiet pre-positioning of cyber capabilities against infrastructure are, in my view, pieces of the same preparation. The end game I see is population reduction and a new authoritarian order — fewer rights, more surveillance, and a public trained to accept exceptional measures as normal.

I do not claim that one committee has signed a single document titled "the plan." The evidence for that kind of coordination is not documented, and I will not pretend it is. What I am offering is a reading of a pattern I have watched for a long time: a war industry that never stands down, cities used as laboratories, legal shortcuts at home, and digital weapons aimed at the systems civilians depend on. You can reject the reading. You should not ignore the record underneath it.

A call for peace

I want peace. I want governments to stop treating war as a growth industry. I want the lessons of Fallujah, Mosul, Raqqa, and Gaza to be a warning, not a training syllabus for the next time a government loses its nerve in a Western city. I want immigration policy that is honest about numbers, housing, and social capacity, without turning neighbours into enemies. I want emergency powers to be a last resort — and, if the courts have told us they were used unlawfully, I want that to matter the next time a cabinet is tempted. I want the power grid, the water system, and the hospital to be off-limits, in every country, including our own.

I have spent thirty-five years watching this file and fifteen years standing in the street over it. I am not asking anyone to take my theory on faith. I am asking Canadians to look at the spending, the doctrine, the court record, and the cyber warnings, and then to decide what kind of country they still want.

If you want to support independent work that says these things out loud, you know where to find Alberta Radio.

Sources

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